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Fraud, corruption and maladministration in South Africa has not only led to the looting of state 
funds, but has denied the poor access to basic services.  The South African government has 
measures in place including legislation, codes of conducts, laws, and rules in its efforts to combat 
fraud.  Over and above these measures, the government has established Chapter 9 institutions to 
play an oversight role as it tries to promote good governance and restore trust in public service.  
The aim of this study was informed by whether the fraud fighting (Fraud Prevention Plan) 
measures, policies, plans and strategies of the KwaZulu Natal Department of Health are efficient, 
effective and if they are yielding any benefits. 
 
The study was conducted in the eThekwini Region of KwaZulu Natal; a sample of 120 employees 
from the Department was randomly drawn and 91 responses were received (76% response rate).  
The sample was not based on their gender, position held or the level of education.  Responses were 
collected using self-administered questionnaires.  Findings revealed that more than 80% of the 
respondents agreed that the Department is crippled by fraud and more than 82% have never 
attended a fraud awareness training, while more than 72% did not even know the Department’s 
Tip-Offs Anonymous (whistle-blowers hotline) number. An overwhelming majority agreed that 
the Department is a victim of fraud committed by greedy and unethical staff members.  Over 83% 
of the respondents believed that stronger internal controls can prevent the occurrence of fraud, 
while 81% felt that it was management’s responsibility to prevent fraud in the Department.   
 
The researcher recommended that the Department embark on a fraud awareness campaign that will 
give training to staff regarding its existing fraud prevention plan.  It was also recommended that 
new employees be trained on this plan.  Communicating the findings and decisions taken on the 
perpetrators of fraud was seen as one way of sending a strong message to the employees that 
fraudsters will not be tolerated in the Department.  The study achieved it objectives, although there 
were limitations such as the limited literature in general on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
fraud risk management.        
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation for Study  
Power (2013) notes that, most organisations are susceptible and vulnerable to fraud.  The rise in 
fraudulent activities and corruption within the public service does not only cost government 
money, but it hinders the economic development of a country.  Fraud also diminishes public trust 
and the credibility of the government (Pillay, 2004).  The Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE) presumed that globally fraud losses were estimated to be US$400 billion in 
2001.  To date, it is estimated that fraud costs organisations more than $3 trillion per annum, which 
means fraud is on an increase compared to previous years (Epsley, 2008).   
Although fraud affects all sectors, growing public sector fraud is worrying and taxpayer’s funds 
are channelled towards funding fraud. The 2013 Global Corruption Index, published by the non-
governmental organisation Transparency International (TI), revealed that SA has dropped down 
34 places since 2001 in the rankings and out of 175 countries, South Africa is ranked at 17.  A 
study conducted by The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), suggests that between 2006 
and 2011 the number of South Africans that think tackling fraud and corruption should be made a 
national priority doubled from 14% to 26% (Newham, 2014).    
Although fraud, corruption and maladministration are a national problem, this is largely evident at 
the provincial level as the KwaZulu Natal Department of Health (KZNDOH) is also confronted by 
an increase in fraud and corruption.  Its Risk Management/Governance Unit has developed a 
comprehensive Fraud Prevention Plan (FPP) also known as Fraud Risk Management (FRM) 
program as part of interventions and strategies efforts to eradicate fraud.  A pressing challenge 
however is measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the program.  This study aims to 
investigate the challenges faced by KZNDOH with regards to fraud and measuring the efficiency 
and effectiveness of their FRM. The study will also determine whether the Department’s existing 
interventions are yielding the required and desired results.  Essentially, it is envisaged that the 
findings from this study will contribute to efforts by the Governance Unit in identifying a wide 





1.2. Problem Statement  
The Republic of South Africa (RSA) has a three-tier system of government with each level, namely 
national, provincial and local government/municipalities, acting as autonomous entities. Provincial 
governments belong to the second level of government and were established by Chapter 6 of the 
Constitution.  South Africa has nine provinces; KwaZulu Natal (KZN) has the largest population 
with over 10 million citizens, accounting for 19.8% of the national population (STATSA, 2015 ).  
It has 16 provincial Departments with the KZNDOH receiving  about 32% (R30.9 billion) of the 
total 2014/2015 provincial budget (Scott, 2015). KZNDOH like many other government 
Departments is facing challenges in its fight against growing fraudulent activities, corruption and 
maladministration (Zungu, 2014b).   
KZNDOH’s 2013/2014 Annual Report revealed that the Department has investigated about 40 
cases on fraud during 2013/2014 financial year.  The report further states that a total of 169 
misconduct and disciplinary hearings were held and finalised, this included 64 dismissals; 31 
suspensions without pay; 57 final written warnings; five demotions, and four written warnings.  
The Department has an in-house investigating team and it also appoints external investigators 
when necessary, particularly in cases where allegations of fraud have been reported. In response 
to fraudulent acts the Department has developed fraud risk policies and strategies such as its Fraud 
Prevention Plan (FPP), Risk Management Strategy (RMS) and Risk Management Policy (RMP) 
(Zungu, 2014b). 
While these various fraud risk policies and strategies exist, an area of contention is how to measure 
the effectiveness of the FRM.  The degree of fraud, corruption and maladministration in the 
Department suggests that there are gaps in their attempt to combat fraud.  The high incidence of 
fraud, in spite of sound policies and strategies to combat it, speaks to these gaps. While the FRM 
policies and strategies are available and approved by the management, no study has been 
conducted to assess and determine their efficiency and effectiveness. This study addresses the 
broad question of how efficient and effective the fraud risk management strategies of the 
KZNDOH are.       
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 1.3. Research Questions 
This study will address the following key questions:  
a. Are the current interventions in the existing FRM strategies helping the Department 
in combating fraud? 
 
b. Do employees understand the FRM and understand their role in the fight against 
fraud within the Department?  
 
c. How can the Department involve all the employees and other stakeholders 
(community) to understand their role in combating fraud? 
 
1.4. Research objectives 
In responding to the questions and gaps outlined in previous sections (Sections 1.2 and 1.3), the 
objectives of this study are as follows: 
a. To investigate whether the current fraud risk management strategies are yielding 
any results in the fight against fraud. 
 
b. To investigate employee’s knowledge of fraud risk management. 
 
c. To establish employee involvement in the fight to combat fraud. 
 
d. To investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department’s current fraud 
risk management interventions, by the responses from the employees of the 
department, whom the intervention is aimed for; and    
 
e. To identify areas susceptible to fraud (risk areas), and how more efforts and 





1.5. Limitations of the Study 
A few limitations emerged in the process of conducting the study, these include:  
a. The limited time (less than four months) to conduct the the study due to delays in 
the ethical clearance process. 
 
b. The focus of the study on one region (eThekwini Region) out of the four in KZN 
and the participation of some, not all, of the officials in the Department. Thus the 
findings of the study do not reflect the views of all employees of the KZNDOH.  
 
c. The unwillingness, by respondents, to complete an online (questionpro.com) survey 
which led to the manual distribution and capture of their responses, resulting in a 
time- consuming data collection process.  
 
d. A limited availability of literature on the efficiency and effectiveness of fraud risk 
management.  
 
1.6. Outline of the Study  
This dissertation is divided into six chapters.  This chapter provides an overview of the topic, and 
presents the rationale for the study. It also presents the problem statement, the objectives and 
research questions that underpin the study. It also discusses the limitations of the study. Chapter 
Two carries out a literature review exercise which examines the effects of fraud on the various 
levels of government and other entities. The chapter also examines relevant theories to fraud risk 
management, fraud, corruption and maladministration. In Chapter Three, the various research 
methods and the criteria for their selection for this study are discussed. Chapter Four briefly 
presents the findings of the study with a focus on responding to its objectives. Chapter Five 
continues from Chapter Four by engaging in a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the 
study’s findings. Chapter Six concludes the study with relevant recommendations that might 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of fraud risk management at KZNDOH.  It also presents 
limitations and areas for further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses key concepts like fraud within the context of various spheres of government 
and other organisations. Due to limited literature on the efficiency and effectiveness of FRM, this 
section will review and discuss general literature on FRM, FPP and anti-fraud.  In addition, it will 
review relevant literature in connection with efficiency and effectiveness in fraud risk management 
across various sectors (national and international). The following then will be examined:  
a. Fraud statistics and detection 
b. Fraud theories 
c. Public Service fraud risk management 
d. Fraud smart organisation   
e. Various theories on effective and efficient fraud risk management in the private sector and 
public sectors. 
Fraud is a disruptive force in any organisation no matter the size, industry, country or location.  On 
the other hand, fraud risk can and must be regulated by an organisation.  The actual fraud and fraud 
risk are opposite concepts; one is the deed (actual fraud) and the other is a possibility or 
vulnerability to risk (Mock and Turner, 2005).   Fraudulent activities and fraudsters have been in 
existence for thousands of years.  Organisations have focused and spent billions on fraud 
investigations.  Corporate fraud is a threat not only to public trust but to the corporate sector 
(Forensic, 2006). Organisations are trying their best to formulate proactive strategies to prevent 
fraud, by developing appropriate interventions including business codes of ethics, rules, 
procedures, internal controls in preventing fraud.  These interventions are also known as fraud risk 
management or anti-fraud strategies.  No organisation is safe, insusceptible, immune or 
invulnerable to fraud (Power, 2013).    
Fraud is a global phenomenon that affects private, public and not for profit organisations.  It is 
committed by people (within or outside an organisation) that know the weaknesses or vulnerability 
in its internal controls.  Stronger internal controls and regulations do not guarantee a fraud free 
organisation (Epsley, 2008) .  In South Africa, there is an impression that only the public sector is 
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vulnerable to fraud. Governments are deemed to be more vulnerable to fraud because they are 
expected to be accountable and open to public scrutiny.  Private entities do not disclose fraudulent 
activities in order to safeguard their reputation and the interests of stakeholders. (Marias, 2013).   
Hedley (2012) stated that there are three objectives when designing an effective business focused 
fraud and misconduct risk management, they are:   
a. Prevention: the primary objective is to prevent fraud, corruption or maladministration 
from occurring from the onset;  
b. Detection:  Processes, reviews and internal controls designed to proactively realize fraud, 
corrupt activities and misconduct when it occurs; and  
c. Response:  Reactive actions designed to take corrective decisions when fraud has occurred 
(e.g. disciplinary processes or investigations). 
Hopwood et al. (2012) define fraud as an intentional misrepresentation (dishonesty) made by an 
entity or individual; knowing that the deception’s final result could result in him receiving undue 
benefit at the expense of the other (person or entity). Undetected fraudulent activities make it 
difficult to measure or calculate actual losses from fraud in the public health care sector.  In South 
Africa the Department of Public Health remain the most targeted sector by fraudsters (Talane, 
2013). 
The fraud concept is often linked and misinterpreted with concepts like factual error, carelessness, 
abuse, misconduct and corruption. Manipulation and fraud are terms that are also closely related. 
Facts (the intent by the person) presented must be taken into consideration to distinguish whether 
it an abuse/manipulation or fraud.   The term “abuse” may not necessarily be unlawful or mean 
that fraud has taken place.  Elements of fraud must be present, for an act to qualify as being 
fraudulent (Power, 2013). 
Despite the government prioritizing fraud by putting forward various legislation, creating Chapter 
9 institutions, intervening politically and combating fraud at the National Department of Health 
(DOH), these all remain an important and very expensive exercise (Nxumalo, 2010).  The limited 
resources to fight fraud and the ability of fraudsters to always remain one step ahead has made 
combating fraud a very difficult and tasking process that requires continuous improvement and 
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training.  While traditional fraud investigations remain the most widely used method of combating 
fraud, they are costly, reactive and also time consuming (Barnes, 2014).  
DOH and its vulnerability to fraud continues to make headlines on various media outlets.  Former 
DOH Minister Dr. Mantombazane Shabalala launched the National Department of Health Fraud 
Prevention Plan in 2003 (Barnes, 2014).  It appears that such intervention had little effect to stop 
the spread of fraud within the Department.  In 2013, a R1.4 billion fraud was revealed in Eastern 
Cape (Rooyen, 2013).  Gauteng Health Department fired more than eight employees pertaining to 
fraudulent qualifications (SAPA, 2015).  KZNDOH is also inundated with allegations and 
newspaper reports on alleged internal fraud and corruption.  The interventions by the Department 
have been predominantly reactional.  It then focuses most of it’s energy and resources in 
conducting fraud investigations (Talane, 2013).  
2.2. Fraud Statistics  
According to the 2012 ACFE report on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, organisations have lost 
approximately 5% of their revenue due to fraud. Fraud investigations costs organisations 
approximately $140,000 per case.  The average time of investigation was 18 months.  Small 
businesses are the most affected by fraud. It has been found that most high profile fraud cases were 
committed by individuals in senior management positions.  Approximately 81% of fraudsters 
showed one or more red flags like living beyond their current means, experiencing financial 
difficulties and struggling to make ends meet, having suspiciously close relationships with 
suppliers, customers and monopolising specific duties (Bell and Jhang, 2013). 
According to Corruption Watch there are no accurate stats for corruption in South Africa 
(Tamukamoyo, 2014).  The South African Police Services (SAPS) does not distinguish between 
different types of commercial crime.  Therefore, the results are all recorded in a broad category 
called commercial crime which covers white collar crime, credit card fraud, public sector 
procurement fraud, and corruption among others).  Commercial crime has been on the increase 
since statistics were published in 2011/2012.  In the same period, the cases reported to SAPS 
increased by 63.8%, resulting in an additional 35 700 cases.  In 2012/2013, cases reported 
increased by 4% (67.8%) from the previous period, with a total number of 91 569 cases.  For 
2013/2014, cases reported decreased drastically by more than 13%, with 12 460 less cases than 
the previous year, bringing the total number of cases to 79 109 (Tamukamoyo, 2014). 
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According to statistics released by the Public Service Commission (PSC) on public sector fraud, 
the government lost approximately R1 billion in 2011/2012 and R130.6 million in 2006/2007 to 
fraud.  The Special Investigation Unit (SIU) estimates that in 2011 the real fraud value was sitting 
at R30 billion annually. The Institute for Accountability estimated that South Africa has lost R675 
billion as result of fraud and corruption since 1994 (Tamukamoyo, 2014).  These figures attest to 
the fact that funds are being looted and public funds are being depleted through fraud.  Fraud 
affects progress, government services and communities (StatSA, 2014).   
A press release dated 25 November 2015 by the office of the Auditor General of South Africa 
(AGSA) highlights the challenge faced by the government.  It stated that the findings of the 
2014/2015 national and provincial Department audit report revealed an irregular expenditure of 
R25.7 billion.  Although this was a slight decrease (of about 27%) from the amount of R35.28 
billion listed in the 2013/2014 audit report, it still an unacceptable figure (Makwetu, 2015 and 
Areff, 2015).  Eight out of the 16 Departments in KZN received clean audits, an increase from 
only six Departments in 2013/2014.  The Auditor General also found that there was a 5% 
improvement (compared to 19% for 2013/2014) in compliance efforts.  Compliance was found not 
to be moving at a desired pace in preventing unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure. 
There was a slight increase in unauthorised expenditure by over 79%.  This amounted to R143 
million for 2014/2015 with the Department of Health responsible for 90% (Makwetu, 2015)  
2.3. Detection of fraud 
Most organisations only form of detection is through routine oversight activities such as their 
annual auditing processes.  Auditing and monitoring plays a crucial role in ensuring that an 
organisation has effective risk management and good governance processes.  Auditing has always 
been perceived as a formal process which gives assurance that sampled functions comply with 
various organisational rules, regulations, policies, procedures, controls and a country’s laws and 
statutes (Richard et al., 2011).  The scale and the norm of audits is usually at a large scale and 
impossible to look at all the functions at a 100%, so they use sampling models which are not always 
accurate.  The primary goal of auditing is to identify weaknesses, other organisational problems 
and propose or recommend solutions to management. Auditors  have a direct communication and 
account to the Audit Committee and Board of Directors (Richard et al., 2011).    
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According to the ACFE Survey of 2012 (as shown on Figure 2.1 below) both internal and external 
auditing was not an effective tool to timely detect fraud.   Organisations relying exclusively on 
auditing to detect fraud were most likely to experience fraudulent activities.  The ACFE survey 
2012 also found that more than 43% of fraud was detected through Tip Offs (Whistle-blowers).  
Tip -Offs Anonymous was the most effective system of detecting fraud (Bell and Jhang, 2013).  
Not all (especially medium size organisation) organisations have a hotline therefore there are 
chances that they are more vulnerable to fraud (Richard et al., 2011).    
 
Figure 2.1: ACFE Report on Occupational Fraud & Abuse (ACFE, 2012) 
 
2.4. Fraud theories 
Wells (2011) states that research on occupational fraud dated back to the early 1930s by Edwin H. 
Sutherland, but his study was limited by its focus on fraud committed by senior-level executives. 
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2.4.1. Fraud triangle 
The most cited literature when researching the topic of fraud is Donald R Cressey in his book 
“Other People’s Money” published in 1953.  He conducted studies seeking to answer the one 
question of “why people commit fraud”.  His study, which disagreed slightly with that of 
Sutherland’s, concluded that embezzlement by employees was not necessarily illegal (Cressey, 
1953).  His research provided evidence that was contradictory to that of Sutherland (Slezak, 2013).   
Cressey referred to embezzlers as “trust violators” because they solved their financial problems by 
violating their position of trust and stealing funds from their employer.  Cressey (1953) concluded 
that there are three fundamental factors that lead to the “violation of trust”.      
Figure 2.2 below shows the fraud triangle which shows the reasons for why people commit fraud 
(Cressey, 1953).    
 
Figure 2.2:  Donald R. Cressey’s fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953) 








No. Element Meaning 
1 Opportunity Ability to assess the situation and opportunity to commit fraud without 
being caught.   
2 Pressure/Motive Extreme financial need (whether for the good or bad) pushing one towards 
committing fraud. 
3 Rationalization When the fraudster justifies his or her actions of deception and dishonesty, 
there is sense of entitlement.  Others will view their fraudulent action as 
borrowing for a time being, meanwhile violating the trust 
 
Table 2.1:  The elements of the fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953) and (Wells, 2011). 
2.4.2. The fraud diamond concept 
Over and above Cressey’s fraud triangle concept, a new concept Fraud Diamond was born.  The 
Fraud Diamond Model was introduced by Wolfe and Hermanson in 2004, as shown in Figure 2.3 
below, where they extended the fraud triangle by one concept “The Fraudster’s capabilities" 
(Kassem and Higson, 2012).   
 12 
The Fraud Diamond 
 
Figure 2.3: The Fraud Diamond 
Kassem and Higson (2012) concurs with Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) who posited that certain 
fraudulent activities could be avoided by organisations.  To achieve this, they would need staff 
with knowledge on how to identify the traits of those who commit fraud.  There are four noticeable 
traits of those who commit fraud:  
 They are persons in the position of power in an organisation; 
 They are well-informed and capable to exploit the system and by-pass weak internal 
controls;  
 They are always confident that they can cover their trails and cannot be caught; and  
 They have the capacity to deal with the stress that comes when committing fraudulent acts  
2.5. The two main fraud theories   





2.5.1. Occupational Fraud 
The Founder and Chairperson of the internationally acclaimed body, ACFE, Mr Joseph Wells 
defines occupational fraud and abuse as enriching yourself, by knowingly misusing your 
employers resources for personal gain (Wells, 2011).   Occupational fraud is not committed by 
certain employees at a specific level, but it means by employees at all levels (from operational to 
executive levels).  Fraud does not mean that large sums of money must be lost or embezzled to 
qualify as fraud.  It also ranges from petty theft to sophisticated, well planned and executed 
fraudulent acts.   Wells (2011) further states that there are general elements that must be present 
for a fraud to exist:  
a. There must be a false statement and the person making this false statement must have full 
knowledge that it is false but he/she continues to utter it;  
 
b. The company or the person (victim) being defrauded must rely on the false statement 
(deception); and  
 
c. The false statement must cause damages (financially or otherwise) to the victim.  
Should an employee violate his or her fiduciary duties, that violation may be regarded as fraud.  
Wells (2011) believes that with proper prevention and detention measures, fraudulent activities 
such as skimming, cash larceny, cheque fraud, misappropriation of company assets, among other 
forms of fraud, can be reduced or minimized significantly.     
The employees involved in corporate fraud are sometime referred to as “rogue employees”.  These 
employees will always stray from their core duties regardless of the level they occupy and they 
violate the company from within.  In addition, their own interests are not aligned to that of a 
company.  They contribute significantly to any financial and reputational damages to the company, 
because their goal is to steal, defraud and fill their pockets to the detriment of the organisation 
(Beigelman and Bartow, 2012).   
Fraud can lead to the collapse of highly successful and stable companies.  In the recent past we 
have witnessed the collapse of big corporations like Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and Aldelphia.  In 
most of these companies, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and other top executives were held 
accountable for the fraudulent acts committed in their organisation.  The collapse of such empires 
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have put a strain on the economy because thousands lose their jobs (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012). 
Fraud was so prevalent in the United States of America (USA) in early 2002, such that former 
President George W. Bush, on realising that fraud was a problem, made corporate responsibility 
the core element of his administration, along with the war on terror (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012).  
Beigelman and Bartow (2012) highlights President Bush’s agenda to fight against fraud which 
included: 
a. Uncovering and taking action against acts of fraud; 
b. Holding executive and business owners accountable; 
c. Protecting the working class and pension holders; 
d. Ensuring the transparency of financial statements; 
e. Developing proactive and solid corporate governance; and  
f. Being open and making information available to investors.  
 
2.5.2. Corporate fraud 
In previous sections, we defined both general and occupational fraud.  Occupational fraud looks 
at an individual employee, whereas corporate fraud focuses on organisational fraud.  Corporate 
fraud can be defined as the misrepresentation of financial information to manipulate interested 
parties e.g. the Receiver of Revenue and other regulatory bodies; taking bribes by officials for 
certain information; overstating the assets value and any other activity that might obstruct justice. 
(Beigelman and Bartow, 2012).  
It an established fact that fraudulent acts will always be committed.  Fraud will therefore occur, 
whenever an opportunity presents itself. This phenomenon will never stop until organisations, act 
and embrace fraud prevention.  Fraud prevention needs to be implemented at all levels of an 
organisation, including  at the level of senior management (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012). 
A study conducted by the ACFE in 2012 found that when ranked by categories (as shown on Figure 
2.4 below), 87% of fraud in organisations are a result of asset misappropriation followed by 
corruption (33.4%).  Financial statement fraud stands at the bottom of the list of the causes of fraud 
at 7.6% (Bell and Jhang, 2013).    
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Figure 2.4: Occupational frauds by categories (Wells, 2011) 
2.6. Fraud Risk Management  
Iyer (2010) defines fraud risk as the chance that committing fraud will negatively impact an 
organisation and that there are three elements of fraud risk:  
a. The method of fraud that an employee will use,  
b. The effectiveness of an organisation’s internal controls; and  
c. The degree of deceitfulness, the skills and ability of the fraudster. 
2.6.1. Fraud Prevention 
The ultimate goal for any organisation is to have a zero percent fraud rate.  Companies are 
unfortunately operating in an uncertain environment, where fraud can occur when they least expect 
it.   Fraud prevention becomes a necessity for the survival of an organisation (Hedley and Cohen, 
2010).  A 2010 ACFE report stated that on average, organisations were likely to lose 6% of their 
turnover to fraud and corruption (Wells, 2011).  With such losses organisations should be seeking 
to implement strong fraud prevention strategies and policies (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012).  In 
Section 2.4.1, the discussion on the fraud triangle and its three elements (opportunity, motive and 
rationalization) shows that organisations have a good change of combating fraud if they remove 
opportunities that will lead employees to engage in fraud. This can be achieved by improving 
corporate governance (internal controls and accountability) (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012). The 
ACFE manual states that effective fraud prevention should have rules and guidelines that greatly 
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reduce the chances of fraud occurring, while increasing the likelihood of detecting fraud before it 
happens.  The potential fraudster must be aware that these measures exist and the possibilities of 
being caught are high, which essentially should discourage them from committing fraud. 
(Beigelman and Bartow, 2012).   
 
Fraud prevention is a pro-active (fraud detection) approach rather than the traditional reactive 
(fraud investigations) approach, therefore it is needed by all organisations across the globe.  Fraud 
prevention is not only necessary for preventing loss or theft in an organisation, it also secures 
companies from financial risks emanating from lawsuits, federal prosecution, fines/penalties and 
convictions in the court of law for fraud (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012). 
 
Beigelman and Bartow (2012) outline eight key elements of fraud prevention that must be in place: 
 
a. Tone at the top 
The messages and actions at the management level of the organisation must be exemplary; 
they must obey the rules, codes of conducts and regulations of the company.  If they fail to 
adhere to the rules they must not expect employees to follow them (Hedley and Cohen, 
2010).    
 
b. The Role of the Board of Directors and the Audit Committee 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, requires that Board of Directors are caretakers of good 
corporate governance and take general oversight of the organisation’s management 
(Hopwood et al., 2012).  Members of the Audit Committee have an important role to play 
in enforcing compliance with rules and policies of an organisation, while also enforcing 
the laws that govern the country and standard regulations that guide the industry.  Directors 
of companies who do not abide by these laws, policies and regulations may be held 
responsible either civilly and criminally or both (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012) .   
 
c. The Internal Audit 
As much as internal audits only detect a very low percentage of fraudulent activities, 
internal audit units face the challenge of ensuring that controls are followed (Hartley, 
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2014).  An ideal situation is when internal audit processes are able to detect fraud before it 
takes place.  The role of FRM becomes crucial in the work of internal audit units, because 
employees become aware as to what constitutes fraud and they report any wrong doing in 
a timely manner (Epsley, 2008).  
 
d. The important role of managers on fraud prevention 
Hopwood et al. (2012)  state for the fraud prevention to be possible, management needs to 
exercise their oversight role with diligence.  Wrong doers need to be held accountable, and 
be reported accordingly to the relevant parties/stakeholders.  Epsley (2008) supports their 
view by stating that managers need to possess an ability to detect and see the red-flags 
(warning signs) of fraud.  Strong and committed leaders are integral to the success of fraud 
prevention and internal control programs.  
 
e. Integrity and honesty 
Majority of organisations have values that their staff must abide by such as integrity and 
honesty. Fraud prevention strategies should be able to educate their employees on these 
values regardless of the positions they hold (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012).   
 
f. An effective communication plan  
Most  of the reported fraud cases came through the Anonymous Tip off or Hotline, which 
makes it one of the most effective fraud prevention mechanisms (Marias, 2013).  No matter 
the size or the industry the organisation belongs to, it important that it has an effective and 
reliable reporting system. This system gives employees and other outside parties an 
opportunity to report suspicious activities that could be fraudulent.  Whistle-blowers also 
need to be protected at all costs, so that they will have confidence in the system  (Asare 
and Wright, 2004).   
 
g. Cross-Group Collaboration 
Multi-disciplinary intervention is required across all divisions of an organisation, so that 
all employees speak in one voice and work together in the fight against fraud.  This ensures 
that they are a unified front in their efforts to combat fraud (Beigelman and Bartow, 2012).   
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h. Embracing a Culture of Compliance  
Organisations that have a strong culture of fraud prevention programs and sound internal 
controls are bound to enjoy better and superior competitive advantage.  The culture of 
compliance must be embraced by all the stakeholders in an organisation (Goldman and 
Kaufman, 2010).   
2.6.2 Fraud Risk Assessment (FRA) 
Fraud Risk Assessment (FRA) is a crucial program when an organisation is proactively against 
fraud and is committed to combating it. This means it forms an organisational broader risk 
assessment process.  A fraud risk assessment looks into an organisation to identify vulnerable areas 
and the ways that fraud and misconduct can occur (Richard et al., 2011).  According to (Bell and 
Jhang, 2013), the benefits of having a sound and comprehensive fraud risk assessment are as 
follows: 
a. It measures an organisation’s susceptibility to fraud;  
b. It provides structure in efforts to proactively tackle the potential of fraud  
c. It increases the potential of reducing exposure from fraud risk; 
d. It supports and supplements risk management and internal auditing units in identifying and 
helping to prevent, detect and prevent fraud (Bell and Jhang, 2013); and 
e. It helps to address areas of exposure in an organisation where internal controls may have 
limitations like sampling  
2.7. Fraud Smart organisation 
In his book Fraud Smart, KH Spencer Pickett, 2011 highlights that as much as fraud risk 
management is important as a form of combating fraud; organisations need to be Fraud Smart as 
well.  Unlike in the past, when an employee would act in a dishonest way or commit acts of fraud, 
organisations would find a way to part with an employee privately.  For these organisations, a 
successful way of dealing with the matter was to pay the culprit and send him packing secretly.   
The downside of these old-style solutions meant that other employees were not made aware of the 
potential for fraud or the fraud-management process (Pickett, 2011).  A Fraud Smart organisation 
is one that is pro-active in their fight against fraud and corruption, where all employees understand 
their roles in the fight against fraud, and the organisation does not conceal its its fight against fraud 
and adopts a zero tolerance policy to it (Pickett, 2011). The only way to combat fraud in an 
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organisation is to ensure that employees support the fraud risk management and are part of a robust 
anti-fraud strategy.  Failure to involve employees might result in an organisation being subjected 
to continuous fraud and abuse (Pickett, 2011).   
 
Pickett (2011) divides the workforce of an organisation in three main groups namely: 
a. The minority (small group) that will make an attempt and commit fraud against the 
organisation; 
b. A fairly large group of individuals who are specialists, like Accountants, Auditors, Senior 
Management) and other professionals who are looking for ways of combating fraud or 
fighting against it; and 
c. Those that are on the fence who have no interest in fraud in the workplace as it has no 
impact or relevance to their jobs. 
The first group above already pose a problem as they are always looking for new ways of 
committing fraud.  The second group is knowledgeable on fraud-related concepts and aware of the 
expectations from the executive of the organisation.  The last group are those that can help the 
company in the fight against fraud and can learn more on the impact of fraud in an organisation 
(Pickett, 2011). Still it is important to generate a Fraud Smart workforce that understands and safe 
guards the organisation against dishonesty (Pickett, 2011).  Figure 2.5 speaks of five stages on the 
fraud smart cycle: 
2.7.1. Understanding the threat 
Unlike other risks, fraud represents a direct threat to an organisation rather than potential 
opportunity.  An organisation must therefore have knowledge of the internal and external threats 
facing them, through their comprehensive fraud risk management strategies.  All organisations, 
whether in the private, government (public) or not-for-profit sectors, are vulnerable to threats of 
fraud (Pickett, 2011). 
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Figure 2.5:  The Fraud Smart Cycle (Pickett, 2011) 
 
Smaller organisations are crippled by occupational fraud in most instances as most of them do not 
have enough funds to protect themselves against possible fraud, unlike the larger companies that 
have sufficient resources to obtain sound anti-fraud strategies and controls.  This makes them more 
vulnerable to fraud threats (Wells, 2011). 
 
 2.7.2. Appreciating respective roles 
A dishonest employee can harm an organisation. Fraud happens when controls fail and an 
opportunist take advantage of the gaps in the controls and commit acts of fraud (Pickett, 2011).  
While most organisations tend to rely more on an audit, both internal and external auditing were 
found not to be an effective tool in detecting fraud. As much as audits play a significant role in 
preventing fraudulent behaviour, it should not be the sole form of  fraud detection (Wells, 2011). 
 
Stakeholders expect a zero tolerance policy to fraud. Board of directors, citizens in the public 
















an organisation, whether it is in from the public, private or non-profit sectors (Pickett, 2011).  An 
organisation must consider the roles of its employees and be informed on how they can work 
together to minimize the fraud threats.  It is management’s duty to ensure that everyone 
understands and is knowledgeable about fraud and they have the right skill and capacity to cope 
prevent it (Pickett, 2011). 
2.7.3. Embracing sound organisational codes of ethics 
An organisation should be clear on how it deals with conflicting priorities.  Management and 
employees must disclose potential and actual conflicts of interest.  These declarations must be 
documented by legal counsel. They must also cultivate a culture of embracing sound ethics and 
promote honesty within an organisation.   Zero tolerance to fraud starts with employees possessing 
and understanding the organisation ethical culture (Pickett, 2011).  Figure 2.6 illustrates how the 
cultural integration process should unfold.  Management should implement the organisational code 
of ethics, which sets the standards and expectations in terms of behaviour and speaks to integrity, 
accountability and transparency.   
 
 




















2.7.3.1. Cultural Integration 
Ethics should be cultivated in such a way that employees behave as expected because it is the right 
thing to do not because they have been instructed or forced. It should form part of the performance 
management process for employees (Pickett, 2011).  The cultural integration process is usually 
divided into three broad categories namely, awareness, assessment and disciplinary code (Pickett, 
2011), namely:: 
 
Awareness: All employees should be aware of the existing code of ethics, once 
implemented.  To achieve this, organisations must carry out awareness campaigns using a 
wide range of materials like posters, screensavers and newsletters (Pickett, 2011). More 
importantly, its content must also be understandable.  
a. Disciplinary Code: Any infringement of the code of ethics must be investigated and dealt 
with immediately (Pickett, 2011). 
 
b. Assessment: After implementing an organisation’s code of ethics, management must keep 
assessing to measure whether the efforts made are successful.  This can be done in the form 
of interviews, staff surveys (preferably conducted by an independent organisation) or an 
internal audit review process (Pickett, 2011). 
2.7.4. Recognizing red flags 
Most of the fraud happens when warning signs (red flags) are ignored.  When an organisation is 
Fraud Smart every employee know how to report or respond to suspicious behaviour.  Red flags  
bring attention to possible areas where fraud might occur and these must be pro-actively dealt with 
as early as possible to avoid future losses (Pickett, 2011). The ACFE report (2010) states that there 
are warning signs that trained auditors and staff can easily detect, for example, if someone is living 
above their means.  Red flags should never be ignored, as they might be the key to detecting or 
deterring fraud (Wells, 2011). 
 
2.7.5. Mastering suitable controls 
The risk of fraud should be properly managed with other business risks that all organisations face.  
Management and all employees must be actively involved and well-versed in safeguarding the 
organisation against fraud (Pickett, 2011).  
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2.8. Public service fraud risk management 
Various government Departments refer to Fraud Risk Management as an Anti-Fraud 
Strategy/Policy or Fraud Prevention Plan.  They all serve a similar purpose which is to pro-actively 
combat fraud (Conradie, 2010, Dlamini, 2014).   In the fight against fraud and corruption the 
national government has developed many laws and policies.  Some of these legislative frameworks 
are aimed at both the public and private sector.  The key legislative acts addressing fraud, 
corruption and other misconducts (Moran, 2009) include: 
a. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act No. 12 of 2004; 
b. The Public Funds Management Act No. 1 of 1999 (PFMA); 
c. Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000;  
d. Public Service Act – Proclamation 103 (Published in Government Gazette 15791 of 3 June 
1994);  
e. Whistle Blowing Protection Act 2011; and  
f. Companies Act 2008 
 
In addition to these legislative acts, the South African government also developed independent 
Chapter 9 institutions such as the Public Protector and the Auditor General.  Both these institutions 
form part of the attempts by government to eradicate fraud, corruption and maladministration 
(Moran, 2009).  A National Government Department Public Service Commission (PSC) conducted 
a study with the aim of obtaining data on the state of fraud prevention activities within government.  
The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy of South Africa defined fraud as a public official that 
abuses their authority for an undue indulgence (Sangweni, 2007) 
 
The study recommended that Departments must:  
 
a. Improve the process of reviewing fraud prevention plans and increase its efforts in 
involving staff and management through the use of awareness campaigns; 
b. Appoint proper resources, such as specialist fraud prevention and risk management and 
internal audit units, and clarify their roles and duties;  
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c. Develop effective ways of promoting awareness and educating employees about fraud 
prevention; and 
d. Tighten internal controls, such as conflicts of interest and procurement policies. (Sangweni, 
2007)  
The study concluded that there is a considerable improvement on the implementation and 
development of fraud risk strategies.  The hard copies of fraud prevention plans were verified and 
they existed.  It was found that the contents of these plans and risk management strategies were of 
a high standard (Sangweni, 2007).  
2.8.1. National government frameworks  
South African National Treasury has a comprehensive draft fraud prevention framework that 
government Departments should adopt and use in their various Departments as a guideline. In 
addition, they also came up with a fraud risk management policy aimed at National and Provincial 
Departments, Constitutional Institutions, Public Entities, Provincial Entities, Municipalities 
(Metropolitan, Local and District).  The framework addresses the need for a robust orientation and 
induction of new employees on the risk of fraud.  It further suggests that current and newly 
appointed staff members are trained and that their attendance and understanding of the state’s risk 
management policy is confirmed by signing forms that attest to this. When an employee 
contravenes the policy, then decisive action can be taken against him or her (Nxumalo, 2010).   
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the challenge facing public and even private entities is 
measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of their Fraud Risk Management initiatives.  While it 
is good and helpful to have frameworks and policies, the inability to measure their effectiveness 
makes them worthless.  Organisations need to create positions for Fraud Risk Managers who can 
solely act as regulators of these policies (Asare and Wright, 2004).   
 
Nkondo (2015) reiterates the lack of full methodology and full study on effective anti-corruption 
practices.  He further states that fraud and corruption are highly complex and continuous research 
in this field is necessary.  He states that interviews, questionnaires, and normal statistical analysis 
(standard social research) into this phenomenon will yield no results.  While the ACFE survey 
(2012) found that more than 43% of fraud is detected through Tip Offs (Whistle-blowers), Nkondo 
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(2015) argues that “whistle-blowing accounts do not reveal as much as there is to be revealed”.  
The few studies that have been conducted in South Africa on corruption have no comprehensive 
and detailed watch on the phenomenon.  He states that these studies will remain incomplete unless 
they focus on certain factors like the nature, causes, functions, financial costs, human costs of fraud 
and corruption and the role played by media, South Africa’s historical context and the never ending 
struggle against corruption.   
2.8.2. Kwa-Zulu Natal Department of Health 
The primary goal of the Governance Unit within the KZNDOH is to ensure that the highest 
standard of governance is maintained and that governance structures within the Department are in 
place to effectively, efficiently and economically use government resources (Zungu, 2014a).  In 
achieving this goal, the Department has an in-house Forensic Unit and has developed a 
comprehensive Fraud Prevention Strategy which includes an action plan. A Risk Management 
Committee is in charge of monitoring the activities by governance unit.  To reach management 
and staff, intranet networks and awareness campaigns are used.  The Department also has a Tip-
Offs Anonymous (Whistle-blowers) line for employees to report fraud, corruption or 
maladministration and remain anonymous.  Only management has access to the hotline.  Should 
an employee wish to send an anonymous email, there is also an e-mail fraud hotline (Dlamini, 
2014). In addition to these  internal methods of reporting tip-offs, external sources of information 
include the Presidential Hotline, PSC Hotline, Office of the Premier and allegations from KZN 
Treasury (Conradie, 2010, Dlamini, 2014).   
 
The primary objectives of developing the Fraud Prevention Plan (Fraud Risk Management/Anti-
Fraud Strategy) was to provide guidelines in preventing, detecting and reporting fraud and 
corruption.  It was also to create an ethical culture; encourage staff and external parties to be part 
of the culture of preventing and detecting fraud; encourage the reporting of suspicious fraud 
without fear;  and to create a culture of accountability and authority (Dlamini, 2014).   
 
The main components of the plan are as follows (Dlamini, 2014): 
a. A code of conduct and business ethics for staff to adhere to; 
b. Strong and comprehensive systems, policies, procedures, rules and regulations; 
c. Clear and unambiguous Disciplinary Codes and Procedures; 
 26 
d. Sound internal controls that can prevent and detect possible fraud; 
e. Security Management ; 
f. Forensic investigation functions to oversee actual investigations and help to recover lost 
funds; 
g. Auditor General to provide independent assurance; 
h. Continuous risk assessment (looking on Departmental vulnerability to fraud); 
i. Establish Fraud policy and response plan for staff and management; 
j. A trust worthy Tip-Offs Anonymous (Whistle Blowing) system that is compliant to 
Protected Disclosures Act;  
k. Robust and inclusive awareness amongst employees and other stake holders; and  
l. Ongoing maintenance plan and Departmental ownership of the plan.  
 
2.9. Measuring Efficiency and Effectiveness of FRM at the University of KwaZulu Natal  
The University takes fraud very seriously and has an adopted a zero tolerance policy to it.  In 
addition, it is committed to ensuring good governance. In fighting fraud, the University has a full 
functional Corporate Governance Unit (Sivnarain, 2013), which comprises of, Internal Audit; 
Forensic Services Unit (Forensic Unit); and Enterprise Risk Management.  This unit was 
established to safe guard the UKZN interests and reduce its vulnerability to fraud, corruption and 
maladministration.  Having an in-house investigative wing, meant less use of consulting firms and 
guaranteed continuity (Sivnarain, 2013). In order to proactively deal with the issue of fraud, 
Forensic Services came up with a Fraud Prevention Policy, which sets the tone and approach in 
dealing with fraud risk at the university.  This policy is in line with the revised 2012 Strategic Plan 
for the University (2007-2016).     
The Forensic Services Department conducted a comprehensive fraud risk assessment, where data 
was collected in the forensic investigation register and a fraud risk survey was developed.  A fraud 
prevention plan was also developed to effectively manage the risk of fraud to which UKZN is 
exposed (Sivnarain, 2013). Sivnarain (2013) believes that to keep abreast with local and 
international best practices, the fraud prevention plan needs to be reviewed on an ongoing basis to 
determine its effectiveness and sustainability.  In 2008 the highest policy making body for UKZN, 
the Council, approved the following two policies:   
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a. Fraud Policy and Response Plan to strengthen existing systems, policies, procedures, rules 
and regulations of UKZN. 
b. Whistle Blowing Policy which gives it’s employees and other interested parties, the ability 
to anonymously report suspicious fraudulent activities.   
In addition to these policies, several interventions have been made to maintain sound governance, 
which include:      
a. Policy on disclosure of interests;    
b. Policy on gifts;   
c. Conflict of interest of Council Members; 
d. Ethics statement for all staff and students; 
e. UKZN procurement policy; 
f. King III principles; and  
g. Code of conduct for Council and Executive Management. 
 
a) Training and Awareness Campaigns 
Fraud awareness training programs, to inform employees on the risk of fraud in UKZN, is 
conducted on a regular basis.  These training programs help employees recognise fraud in its 
infancy and highlights why they need to become actively involved in the fight against fraud.  
b) Workshops within areas vulnerable to fraud 
Review of the past cases undertaken in to facilitate the learning process, thereby addressing past 
weaknesses to prevent repeats of such offences.  All major fraud cases are assessed by the 
Forensics Department.  The success of this intervention is measured by the feedback from the 
employees and management.  More employees and management are willing to report act of 
suspicious fraud.     
c) Tip-Offs Anonymous 
The reporting of suspicions of fraud is made to an independent line called Tip-offs Anonymous.  
Through this reporting facility, employees or any party can report matters of fraud anonymously.    
This Hotline is marketed continuously at the University (Sivnarain, 2013).  
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d) Proactive Fraud Detection 
Proactive fraud detection is undertaken in order to seek evidence of fraudulent transactions, to 
identify environments that are vulnerable to fraud and to address the underlying causes of fraud.  
This process acts as a major deterrent to would-be fraudsters (Sivnarain, 2013). On that basis, 
specific forensic data analytic tests are conducted on the University databases (e.g. employee vs 
supplier master files) in order to identify suspicious transactions. Where exceptions are identified 
among the data these will be analysed in order to determine whether a full scale investigation is 
necessary (Sivnarain, 2013). In addition to these, all University divisions are subjected to fraud 
risk assessments.  
e) Forensic Investigation 
Forensic investigations are inherently reactive in nature, where the objective is to establish the 
facts based on evidence that is collated during the investigation (Sivnarain, 2013). 
2.10. Implementation 
The efficiency and effectiveness of the interventions discussed above has been determined by the 
UKZN forensic unit, through the number and quality of reports received on the Tip-Offs line 
compared to pre-implementation of fraud risk management.  Individuals are also more aware of 
their duties to report and employees understand their vulnerability to fraud within their respective 
duties.  They report any suspicious activities and enquire before taking drastic decisions that might 
be interpreted as fraud.  The FRM program has reached all the management and employees around 
5 campuses (Sivnarain, 2013).   
2.11. Summary 
There is a consensus from the literature that fraud is a serious threat that hinders progress in South 
Africa. It also has a negative impact on the economy and reputation of the country (Nkondo, 2015).  
Organisations and governments are actively combating fraud through various avenues. The South 
African government has come up with laws and institutions to fight against fraud (Pillay, 2004).  
Internal audits prove that while they are useful in accessing controls, they are not sufficient in 
detecting fraud (Goldman and Kaufman, 2010). Organisations are embracing and adopting FRM 
also called Anti-Fraud strategies as a vital tool in fighting and combating fraud, but have not been 
able to measure their effectiveness in both the private and public sectors. Nkondo (2015), further 
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states that a lack of literature on the efficiency or effectiveness of FRM makes it difficult to rely 
on it as the best method to combat fraud.  
We can conclude that culprits commit fraud because organisations relax their controls which 
allows them to do so. Employees and customers are a significant threat to organisations because 
of their role in committing fraudulent acts. If the organisation has strong and effective measures 
in place and harsher punishments are meted out to fraudsters, there is a likelihood that fraudulent 
acts will reduce significantly.  In achieving this, comprehensive controls which aim to prevent or 
combat fraud must be established (Epsley, 2008).  The next chapter examines and discusses the 














CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
Making a decision requires that one finds solutions to their problems.  In finding solutions, 
individuals refer to past experiences or seek information from others who have experienced similar 
problems.  Research is used to find solutions to problems by studying and analysing various factors 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). Sekaran and Bougie (2013) define research as as an ordered, 
methodical, information-based, important, inquiry into a specific problem executed to find 
solutions to the problem. Research therefore contains a series of steps, guided by one or more 
objectives, with the aim of finding a solution to a problem.  Render et al. (2012) state that the most 
important step in undertaking research is to thoroughly define the problem.  
This chapter discusses and outlines the research methodology used in this study as well as its 
objectives and data collection methods. Questionnaires were used to obtain data (See Appendix 
two).  The research strategy is outlined in the following sections. 
3.2. Aim and Objectives of the Study 
KZNDOH like many other national and provincial Departments in South Africa are faced with 
increasing fraudulent (occupational fraud) activities.  In an attempt to reduce the incidence of 
fraud, the Department has drafted various policies (fraud risk management intervention) as 
preventative measures for its employees.  Despite such policies, fraud continues to be a major 
problem facing the Department.  This study therefore aims to measure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the fraud risk management interventions within KZNDOH.     
The objectives of the study are as follows:   
a. To investigate whether the current fraud risk management strategies are yielding 
any results in the fight against fraud. 
 
b. To investigate employee’s knowledge of fraud risk management. 
 
c. To establish employee involvement in the fight to combat fraud. 
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d. To investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department’s current fraud 
risk management interventions.   
 
e. To identify areas susceptible to fraud (risk areas), and how more efforts and 
resources can be used to constructively combat fraud.  
 
3.3. Sampling techniques  
While it was practically possible to collect data from, or to examine the entire population, the 
researcher decided not to take this route because it was unreasonable in terms of time, cost and 
human resources. Sekaran and Bougie (2010) believe that the study of a sample is likely to produce 
more reliable results than the study of an entire population. Page and Meyer (2000) observe that 
the study of a sample produces more reliable results because fatigue is reduced and fewer errors 
are made in data collection, especially when a large number of elements are involved. 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013) a population is “the entire pool from which a statistical 
sample is drawn.”  Kothari (2004) states that “it is very costly and not practical to involve the 
entire population pool in a study for this purposes of this study, the research was restricted to 
employees within the department at the Durban regional office.  The regional head called a meeting 
of managers and supervisors into a meeting.  The researcher was given an opportunity to explain 
the purpose of the research.  Management present at the meeting took 5 questionnaires each to 
distribute in their respective units.  The sampling frame obtained was obtained from management 
with a total population of 120 registered employees.  Given the size of the regional office and a 
large staff complement, time needed the sample chosen was the whole 120.  The table of sample 
size for a given population was employed, which states that for a population size of 155, a sample 
of 110 should be use at a confidence level of 95 percent and a 5 percent margin of error (Sakarana 
and Bougie, 2010). 
Sekaran and Bougie (2013) defined simple random sampling as an unrestricted probability 
sampling design.  Everyone within the population has an equal chance of being selected to 
participate in a study.  This study used a simple random sampling design, because it is less biased, 
easy to generalize and offers more efficient results.  Respondents were not selected based on any 
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criteria like their position, number of years with the Department or level of education, but were 
selected randomly.  There were not given prior notice of their involvement as respondents in the 
study. 
The questionnaires were sent to all 120 employees from the region to avoid biasness.  The 
researcher availed himself for any queries by the participants.  The employees to respondents were 
not selected in any specific criteria, such as position, number of years with the department or level 
of education.   They were selected randomly when surveys were handed out in their respective 
units.  No prior warning that they were going to participate in the research.   A total of 91 responses 
were received which represents a response rate of 76 percent. 
Lohmann and Schmucher (2008) noted that the quality of a survey is dependent on the response 
rate during data collection.  The higher response rates improves the probability that the sample 
results represent the population. The 76 percent response rate was recorded as a good response and 
therefore was used to represent the population of interest. 
3.4. Participants and location of the study 
The current employees of the Department in the Durban Region were all eligible to participate in 
the study.  Their eligibility was not based on their position or their level in the Department but on 
the basis that they all understood the fraud risk management interventions that the Department 
conducted throughout the province.  The study was also conducted in the Durban region because 
of its close proximity to the researcher.   The study excluded employees from the other three 
regions and those who were absent from work.   
3.5. Data collection methods 
Sekaran and Bougie (2013) state that questionnaires are the most efficient, cost effective, and time 
consuming methods of data collection instrument in comparison to other forms of data collection 
like interviews and participant observation. In this study, an informed consent document/form, 
declaration form and a six-page questionnaire were used to collect data. The questionnaire was in 
English, considering that all employees of the Department are appointed on the basis that they can 
understand and can communicate in the English language.    
Quantitative research method was used for the study with questionnaires as the method for data 
collection. An attempt to use an electronic questionnaire (QuestionPro) was not successful as only 
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two out of 120 expected responses were received in a 20-day period.  The researcher had to 
personally administered the questionnaires, resulting in an increased response rate and the quick 
resolution of queries. The responses were anonymously captured on QuestionPro by the 
researcher, after which the questionnaires were filed in a lockable steel cabinet, in a locked office 
which only the researcher has access to.  The captured information was downloaded from 
QuestionPro to Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) to be analysed.   
In addition to the confidentiality clause, instructions and purpose of the study on the cover page, 
the Questionnaire consisted of six pages of 31 multiple choice questions, divided across five 
sections follows: 
Section A:  Question 1 to 6: Profile of respondents such as gender, age, level of education and 
role at work.   
Section B:  Question 7 to 12: Testing of employees’ knowledge, with regards to the concept; 
employees’ concerns and opinions of fraud within the Department.  
Section C:  Question 13 to 17:  Respondent’s opinion on the causes of fraud committed by 
employees (occupational fraud) in the Department.   
Section D:  Question 18 to 23:  Respondent’s knowledge on the existence of fraud risk 
management and other strategies used to fight fraud.   
Section E:  Question 24 to 31:  Employees’ involvement in fighting and combating fraud.   
Question 32, is a non-compulsory comment section, where respondents provide any additional 
comments on the research and any other related topics. 
The respondents were requested to mark their selected option.  They could only choose one option 
per question.   
In order to get information relevant to the objectives of the research, different types of scales 
(Creswell, 2002) were used throughout the questionnaire.  The Nominal (Neuman, 2005) 
measurement scale was used where  YES or NO answers were required.  A Likert measurement 
scale method was also used in four sections, giving respondents the opportunity to respond from a 
neutral stance (Saunders et al., 2011).  The measurement scale ranges were as follows: 
 34 
a. Not at all familiar, slightly familiar, somewhat familiar, moderately familiar and extremely 
familiar; 
b. Not at all aware, slightly aware, somewhat aware, moderately aware and extremely aware 
c. Not at all concerned, slightly concerned, somewhat concerned, moderately concerned and 
extremely concerned 
d. Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree and strongly agree 
3.6. Research Design and Methods 
The direction, quality and the success of a study depends on the chosen research design.  Research 
design is the road map on what data needs to be collected; the type of measurements required and 
the final analysis of the research.  Research design involves extracting accurate data that can be 
easily analysed to find solutions (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). The study was conducted using 
exploratory study design (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013).  
3.7. Obtaining Department’s co-operation 
The researcher contacted the Department’s Head of Risk Management, in February 2015, in order 
to gain access to the Department. The researcher was granted permission pending approval from 
Dr. Sibongile Zungu in his capacity then as Head of Department (HOD).  A gate keeper’s request 
letter was emailed to the office of the HOD on 6 March 2015 with the researcher proof of student 
registration at UKZN and a draft copy of the questionnaire.  A provisional gate keeper’s letter, 
which requested permission to conduct a study, was granted on 15 May 2015 by Dr. Elizabeth 
Lutge – Manager: Epidemiology, Research and Knowledge Management.  The University of 
KwaZulu Natal granted the ethical clearance on 04 September 2015.  The questionnaires were 
distributed on 7 October 2015 and on 20 November 2015. 
The Department granted permission to the researcher with the knowledge that:    
a. Participation was entirely voluntary and information received will be used for research 
purposes only; 
b. Responses will be presented anonymously, and neither the names nor identities of the 
respondents would be disclosed in any form; and 
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c. Records and responses would be kept secure in a lockable steel cabinet and electronic 
information held in a password-protected file accessible only by researcher and dissertation 
supervisor. 
3.8. Reliability of the study 
Sekaran and Bougie (2010) define reliability as a test of how consistently a measuring instrument 
measures whatever concept it is measuring.  They further state that the reliability of a measure 
indicates the extent to which it is without bias while it ensures consistent and accurate 
measurement across time.  Golafshani (2003) stated that an extent to which results are consistent 
over time and an accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to as 
reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the 
research instrument is considered to be reliable.  
Sekaran and Bougie (2010) observed that although it is not possible to exactly calculate the 
reliability or consistency of every study, this can be tested in various ways. This study only 
observes three ways: 
a. Stability measure:  a measure is stable over a period and has minimal or no variation in 
results. 
b. Test-retest reliability:  If a similar study is given to a group of people at two different times, 
a comparison of the results from both times will consistently produce similar outcomes  
c. Internal reliability: consistent indicators make up the scale, resulting in the respondent’s 
scores being relative. 
The questionnaire was designed to capture accurate information that can be tested across the 
Department.  The questions used to collect data are not biased and will also ensure consistent 
measurement.      
3.9. Validity of the study 
Validity determines whether the research accurately measures that which it was intended to 
measure or how truthful the research results are. In other words, does the research instrument allow 
you to accurately conclude on your research object? Researchers generally determine validity by 
asking a series of questions on a questionnaire, and will often make reference to the already 
existing knowledge or reference in the research of others Golafshani (2003).   
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Sekaran and Bougie (2013:insert page number) note that validity is mainly concerned with whether 
we measure the right concept and they define validity as “a test of how well an instrument that is 
designed and developed by the researcher measures the particular concept it is intended to measure.  
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), validity can be determined in the following ways: 
a. Face validity:  Researchers simply look at the items on the research instrument and give 
their opinion if the items appear to accurately measure what they are trying to measure.  
This is the least scientific of all measures of validity; 
b. Criterion rated validity:  When the results from the instrument accurately relates or predicts 
some of the internal variables; 
c. Content validity:  Ensures that the measure accurately covers the range of meanings 
included within a concept that is being measured.   
d. Predictive validity:  Use of future criterion measures.  It indicates the ability of the 
questionnaire to differentiate among individuals with reference to a future criterion. 
Prior to data collection, the researcher conducted the pilot test by asking 12 random Departmental 
employees (including some in management) to complete the questionnaire and provide feedback.  
The feedback was based on the structure, questions, time taken and whether the questionnaire was 
understandable.  The questionnaire was also distributed and discussed amongst the researcher’s 
peers and other fellow researchers to identify gaps and potential contradictions.  Necessary 
amendments were made based on the feedback received.  The final questionnaire was produced 
and used for the study.  The above process was conducted by the researcher to establish the validity 
of the instrument and the results were positive.   
3.10. Data Analysis  
Data Analysis is important in giving sense to the study and the data gathered with the aim of 
answering the research questions and meeting the research objectives.  Sekaran and Bougie (2013) 
state that data collected must be statistically analysed to check if generated hypotheses can be 
supported.  The SPSS was used to analyse data collected. Frequency distribution was a useful 
descriptive tool to compare feedback patterns for groups of people (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013).  
The reaction of respondents to the questionnaire was measured using the central tendency and 
dispersion of variables - mode, median/mean and standard deviation (Render et al., 2012).    
Findings and data were presented in the forms of bar graphs for ease of understanding. The data 
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helped in concluding on the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness of the fraud risk 
management interventions by the Department.   
3.11. Summary 
This chapter discussed the research methodology used for the study, the methods of data collection, 
the sampling process, measurement scale ranges, research design and pertinent information on the 
respondents.  It also highlighted some of the challenges with the initial data collection method of 
online surveys. The chapter also discussed the content of the questionnaire. Having discussed these 

















CHAPTER FOUR - PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
4.1. Introduction 
To achieve the objectives of this study and respond to its research objectives, data was collected 
using questionnaires. The findings were presented in graphs.  The results were sorted following 
sub-sections as they appear on the questionnaire: 
a. The profiles of respondents;  
b. Familiarity with fraud risk management;  
c. Opinions on the causes of fraud committed;  
d. Understanding of the existing interventions of fraud risk management; and  
e. Their involvement in fighting fraud.   
4.2. Survey Response Rate Evaluation 
The response rate was approximately 76% with ninety-one questionnaires completed out of the 
120 that were distributed across the Department. The questionnaires were randomly distributed to 
the employees of the Department.   
The results from the questionnaires are presented as follows: 
4.3. Demographics of the respondents 
Personal details or demographics included information such as age, educational level, current 
position, number of years with the Department and the current role.  Sekaran and Bougie (2013) 
stated that, names of respondents, identity numbers and residential addresses should not form part 
of the questionnaire if they are not required.   
4.3.1. Gender of Respondents  






Figure 4.1: Gender of Respondents  
 
4.3.2. Age of Respondents 
Age forms an integral part of this study, Figure 4.2 below illustrates the ages of respondents. 
 
Figure 4.2: Age of Respondents  
 
The graph shows that 8% of the total respondents were between the ages of 20 and 25 years. More 
than 17% of respondents were between the ages of 26 and 30 years, while 12 respondents, 13% of 
 40 
the total sample, fell between the ages of 31 and 35.  Respondents aged between 36 and 40 made 
up 16% of the total sample.  There were 40 respondents from 40 years and above, the largest 
portion of the sample at 44%.     
 
4.3.3. Educational level 
The respondent’s level of education was important as identified in the literature review.  The results 
are presented on figure 4.3 below:  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Respondent’s highest level of education  
 
 
The results show that none of the respondents possessed Post-Doctoral and Doctoral Degrees, 10% 
completed Masters and Honours degrees.  Seventeen (more than 18% of the sample) respondents 
possess Bachelor’s degree, with more than 39 respondents (more than 43% of the sample) holding 
national diplomas.  The remainder of the 25 respondents possess Matric (20 respondents) and other 
(5 respondents).  
4.3.4. Respondent’s Divisions 
It was stated in the literature review that different divisions within the Department are exposed to 
different types of fraud and corruption.  Figure 4.4 below represents Departments or divisions that 




Figure 4.4: Respondent’s Division  
 
The results show that the majority of respondents (31) who made up more than 34% of the total 
sample) were from Health Services, while 27 respondents (30%) were administrative staff.  Eight 
(9%) and four (4%) employees belonged to Corporate Services and specialized services 
respectively. Maintenance, Technical Services, Risk Assurance Management and other divisions 
only had five, eight and six respondents respectively.    
4.3.5. Work experience 
Work experience has been directly linked to the fraud committed in organisations as examined in 





 Figure 4.5: Respondent’s number of years with the Department 
 
More than 57% of the total sample (52 respondents) have over 5 years work experience with the 
Department, while the rest have less than five years.  
4.3.6. Job role 
Previous research has shown that there is a relationship between the role of an employee and fraud.  
The ACFE report (2010) states that most fraudulent acts are committed by individuals at the 
management level (Wells, 2011).  Figure 4.6 below illustrate the roles that respondents play.    
 
 Figure 4.6: Respondents job role 
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Only one respondent (1%) filled an executive position.  Twenty respondents (more than 22% of 
the sample) occupy managerial positions, while 18 respondents (20% of total sample) were 
supervisors and another 18 respondents worked as administrators (20%).  Thirty-two respondents 
(more than 35% of the sample) have other roles within the Department. 
4.4. Fraud Risk Management at KZNDOH 
The Department has a very comprehensive Fraud Prevention Plan (FPP) and other relevant 
frameworks.  This section tests the respondent’s knowledge of these policies, their overall 
knowledge of fraud and the nature of the Department’s intervention in fighting fraud.   
 
4.4.1. Fraud Risk Management concept 
The literature revealed that both the PSC and the KZNDOH’s fraud risk management emphasize 
that staff members must know the concept.  Respondents were asked whether they are familiar 
with the concept of FRM.  Figure 4.7 presents the knowledge of respondents below: 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Fraud Risk Management Concepts 
 
The figure shows that 15 respondents (more than 16% of the sample) said they were not familiar 
with the concept while another 15 respondents were slightly familiar with the concept.  While 
twenty-one respondents (more than 23% of the sample) were slightly familiar with the concept, 20 
respondents were moderately familiar and another 20 respondents were extremely familiar with 
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the concept, altogether representing more than 43% of the sample).  Statistical results of the data 
were: mean at 3.10, standard deviation at 1.4 and variance of 2.00.   
 
4.4.2. Knowledge of Forensic Investigations Unit  
The literature highlighted the importance of the forensic investigation unit within the KZNDOH.  
With regard to staff awareness of the Department’s forensic investigations unit, the following 
results were illustrated in Figure 4.8 below: 
 
 
  Figure 4.8:  Forensic Investigations Unit awareness 
 
Over 32% of the sample (30 respondents) were fully aware of the unit’s existence, while more than 
26% (24 respondents) were not at all familiar.  The other 13, 10 and 14 respondents were slightly, 
somewhat and moderately aware respectively.  The statistical values were as follows:  mean 3.14, 




4.4.3. Concern with the level of fraud 
 
The literature stated that employees must be part of fraud risk interventions.  Figure 4.9 below 
shows the concern respondents have regarding fraud in the Department.   
 
 
Figure 4.9: Concerns with level of fraud 
 
The results show that 46 respondents (more than 50% of the sample) were extremely concerned 
with the fraud in the Department, while two respondents (above 2% of the sample) were not at all 
concerned.  Eleven respondents (12% of the sample) were slightly concerned, thirteen were 
moderately concerned and 19 were somewhat concerned of the level of fraud in the Department.  











4.4.4. Problem with fraud 
 
The respondent’s opinions on the fraud problem within the Department are reflected in Figure 4.10 
below: 
 
Figure 4.10:  Problem with fraud 
 
An overwhelming majority, 72 respondents (more than 72% of sample) believed that the 
Department had a problem with fraud compared to 17 respondents (19%) who believe that the 




4.4.5. Participation in the fraud awareness training 
 
The Department’s FPP emphasizes that one of its priorities is to train all staff members and 




Figure 4.11: Fraud Awareness Training 
 
The results show that more than 82% of the sample (73 respondents) have never participated in 
the fraud awareness training while only 16 respondents (more than 17% of the sample) have 
participated in the same training. 
 
4.4.6. Tip-Offs anonymous number 
 
The literature review indicated that the most effective tool in fighting fraud is Tip-Offs 




Figure 4.12: Tip-Offs anonymous number 
 
The results indicate that only 24 respondents (more than 27% of the sample) know the Tip-Offs 
Anonymous number, as compared to 63 respondents (more than % of the sample) who are not 
aware of the Tip-Offs Anonymous number.   
 
4.5. Opinion on the causes of fraud committed by employees 
 
The objective of this section of the questionnaire was to ascertain whether respondents have an 
understanding of where fraud stems from.  The feedback gives the Department indications that 
employees might be aware of who are the perpetrators of fraud within the Department.  With 











4.5.1. Department has been a victim of fraud committed by staff 
Respondent’s views on whether the Department is a victim of fraud committed by staff are 
presented in the graph Figure 4.13 below:  
 
 
Figure 4.13 Fraud committed by staff 
 
The results showed that 84% of the sample (70 respondents - made up of 39 who agreed and 31 
who strongly agreed) believe that the Department has been a victim of fraud committed by staff 
members. Fourteen respondents (more than 15% of the sample) were neutral.  Nine respondents 
(five strongly disagreed and four disagreed), making up more than 8% of the sample believe 






4.5.2. Greedy employees commit fraud 
 
Figure 4.14 below shows responses to whether greedy employees commit fraud.   
 
 
Figure 4.14: Greedy employees commit fraud 
 
An overwhelming majority of 68 respondents (76%), was made up of 39 who agreed and 29 who 
strongly agreed that greedy employees commit fraud. Fourteen respondents (16% of the sample) 
neither agreed nor disagreed.  Seven respondents, two who strongly disagreed and five who 







 4.5.3. Non ethical staff commits fraud 
Figure 4.15 below shows responses to whether non-ethical staff committed fraud in the 




Figure 4.15: Non ethical employees commit fraud 
 
Sixty-two respondents, representing more than 70% of the sample, were made up of 45 who agreed 
and 17 who strongly agreed that non-ethnical employees commit fraud. Thirteen respondents 
(more than 14% of the sample) neither agreed nor disagreed, while five strongly disagreed and 




4.5.4. Inadequate internal controls led to employees committing fraud 
Internal controls play an integral role in fighting fraud.  The stronger internal audits are, the higher 




Figure 4.16 Inadequate internal controls 
 
The results reveal that the majority of respondents, representing more than 69% of the sample (61 
respondents, made up of 39 who agreed and 22 who strongly agreed) believed that inadequate 
internal controls led employees to commit fraud.  Seventeen respondents (representing more than 
19% of the sample) neither agreed or disagreed, while only 10 respondents (made up of two who 
strongly disagreed and eight who disagreed, representing more than 11% of the sample) believed 




4.5.5. Poor ethical culture led to employees committing fraud 
The ethical culture of an organisation might influence the level of fraud or corruption being 
committed.  If the tone at the level of senior management appears to be promoting a poor ethical 
culture, it might encourage staff to commit fraud.  The results are reflected on Figure 4.17 below: 
 
 
 Figure 4.17: Poor ethical culture  
 
The results illustrate that more than 37% and 25% respectively of the sample agreed and strongly 
agreed that the poor ethical culture within the Department led to employees committing fraud.    
Fifteen respondents (representing 17% of the sample) neither agreed nor disagreed, while eighteen 
respondents (made up of six who strongly disagreed and eight who agreed, representing 20% of 





4.6. Current FRM interventions  
This section addresses the existing intervention of the Fraud Prevention Plan or FRM strategies to 
ascertain whether they are reaching the intended employees and serving their purpose of helping 
the Department in their fight against fraud.    
 
4.6.1. Fraud risk training attended 
The literature with regards to fraud risk training emphasises that training of staff in fraud risk 
should occur regularly.  The respondent’s responses are set out in Figure 4.18 below:   
 
 
Figure 4.18: Fraud risk training attendance 
 
The results show that most of the employees (69 respondents, representing more than 77% of the 
sample) have never attended fraud risk training.  For the remaining respondents, some have rarely 
(9%), sometimes (7%), often (4%) and always (2%) attended the training.   
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4.6.2. Fraud awareness campaigns 
The literature with regards to fraud awareness campaigns, emphasises that they target all 
employees.  The results are shown below in Figure 4.19: 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Fraud awareness campaigns 
 
The results reveal that 69 respondents (representing 77% of the sample) have never attended fraud 
awareness campaigns.  The remaining respondents have rarely (12%), sometimes (3%), often (4%) 




4.6.3. Fraud risk on the intranet 
The literature review has indicated that employees must be informed about fraud risk and one of 
the effective ways is through intranet networks, which most employees have access to.  Results 
are presented in a graph below (Figure 4.20).  
 
Figure 4.20: Fraud risk on intranet 
 
The results show that 36 respondents (representing 41% of the sample) have never read about fraud 
risk on the intranet, while 31 respondents (36%) have read about it sometimes.  Eleven respondents 
(13%) often read about it.  Only 6% always read about fraud risk on the intranet, while three 




4.6.4. Types of fraud that might occur 
The literature makes emphasis on making employees aware of possible fraud risks within their 
environment.   Employees then can become more vigilant on types of fraud that might occur, and 
fraud can be detected early.  The respondent’s awareness on the type of fraud that might occur in 
their units is presented in Figure 4.21.     
 
Figure 4.21: Type of fraud that might occur 
 
The results show that 37 respondents (representing 41% of the sample) have never been made 
aware of the types of fraud that might occur in their units, while 20 respondents (22%) have 
sometimes been made aware.  Ten respondents (10%) were often made aware.  Seventeen 
respondents (19%) have always been made aware, while six respondents (7%) have rarely been 
made aware of the type of cases that might occur.   
  
 
4.6.5. Awareness of the investigation findings  
One of the key aspects of FRM is disclosure.  The literature review highlights that an organisation 
needs to make employees aware of its zero percent tolerance policy against fraud, by taking 
decisive action against perpetrators.  Employees need to be informed of the findings and decisions 




Figure 4.22 Awareness of the investigation’s findings  
 
 
The results above reveal that 48 respondents (representing 53%of the sample) have never been 
made aware of the findings from acts of fraud investigated in the Department.  Nineteen and 
fourteen respondents have rarely and sometimes been made aware respectively.  At least three and 
six respondents (representing 10% of the sample) have often and always been made aware of the 




4.6.6. Fraud hotline 
A Fraud Hotline has been perceived as the most effective tool for reporting fraud and corruption.  
The Department has a dedicated fraud hotline and anonymous email line.  The results are presented 
in Figure 4.23 below:   
 
 
Figure 4.23 Fraud Hotline 
 
An overwhelming majority of the respondents (83 out of 89), representing 93% of the sample have 
never used the hotline to report fraudulent act.  The other six respondents (representing 7%) have 




4.7. Involvement of employees in combatting fraud 
The involvement of employees in the fight against fraud is crucial.  Their understanding of their 
role in preventing and curbing fraud is without a doubt the most powerful tool in Fraud Risk 
Management (Sangweni, 2007, Mgijima, 2011).  In this section we look at the respondents 
understanding of the role and solutions that can help in the fight against fraud.   
 
4.7.1. Allegations to be investigated by internal staff 
Respondent’s opinion regarding who investigates the allegations of fraud is crucial.  The literature 
also talks of transparency and fairness when investigating allegations of fraud.  Staff might feel 
uncomfortable in reporting matters to their colleagues for investigation.  The respondents were 
asked whether the allegations of fraud must be investigated by the Department’s internal staff, 
their responses are presented in Figure 4.24 below.   
  
 
 Figure 4.24: Investigation to be investigated by the internal staff 
 
The results show that 22 respondents (24%) agreed and 22 (24%) disagreed on whether the 
investigation should be conducted by internal staff.  Fourteen respondents (representing 16% of 
the sample) were neutral (neither agreed nor disagreed), while seventeen and fifteen respondents 
(representing a total of 36%) strongly disagreed and strongly agreed respectively. The data 
indicates that employees are divided on whether Departmental investigators be used or not.  The 
survey did not ask as to the reasons behind their choices.   
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4.7.2. Allegations of fraud to be investigated by consultants 
Respondents feel at ease being investigated by an external party, who has no interest in the 
company.  The disadvantage of using external parties is that they still have to learn about the 
environment, which might cause the investigations to take a longer time.  The results are presented 
in Figure 4.25 below 
 
 
Figure 4.25:  Investigations to be conducted by a consultant (external entity) 
 
As shown in the Figure 4.25, it appears that the majority of the respondents are in agreement that 
Departmental investigations be carried out by external parties (consultants).  Twenty-nine and 26 
respondents (representing more than 62% of the sample) agreed and strongly agreed respectively, 
while 20 respondents (representing 22% of the sample) were neutral.  The rest of the respondents 
(16%), disagreed and strongly disagreed with the use of consultants for internal investigations. 
 
4.7.3. Strong internal controls prevent the occurrence of fraud 
Literature has found that having strong internal controls do not necessarily prevent the occurrence 
of fraud, rather the monitoring and evaluation of those controls might help.  The results are 





Figure 4.26: Strong internal controls prevent the occurrence of fraud 
 
An overwhelming majority of respondents (72 subjects, made up of 42 who agreed and 30 who 
strongly agreed) making up over 83% of the sample, believe that stronger internal controls might 
prevent the occurrence of fraud.  Ten respondents (representing 12% of the sample) were neutral, 







4.7.4. Management is responsible for preventing fraud  
Although there are conflicting views in relevant literature as to who is responsible for prevention 
of fraud, most literature used for this study indicates that it is management’s responsibility to 




Figure 4.27:  Management is responsible for preventing fraud 
 
Approximately 81% of the sample (made up of 37 respondents who agreed and 33 who strongly 
agreed) believed that it was management’s responsibility to prevent fraud.  Eight respondents (9% 
of the sample) remained neutral, while the remaining 9% either disagreed or strongly disagreed 
that it was management’s responsibility.   
 




4.7.5. Auditors are responsible for preventing fraud 
Surveys have found that internal auditors have very little influence in identifying fraud and 
corruption (Wells, 2011).  Staff have faith in internal auditors as they can be used to build 




Figure 4.28: Internal Auditors are responsible for preventing fraud 
 
As shown in Figure 4.28 above, approximately 69% of the sample (made up of 32 respondents 
who agreed and 44 who strongly agreed) believed that it was the responsibility of internal auditors 
to prevent fraud.  Eighteen respondents (20% of the sample) remained neutral, while the remaining 





4.7.6. Code of ethics of staff 
The literature review highlighted that employees should embrace sound organisational code of 
ethics.  It further stated that a zero tolerance policy to fraud starts with employees possessing and 
understanding the organisation’s ethical culture (Pickett, 2011).  Respondent’s perception on the 




Figure 4.29:  Codes of ethics staff 
 
The results show that 85 (97 %) of all respondents (made up of 35 who agreed and 50 who strongly 
agreed), believed that the Department should have a sound code of ethics for all staff. Two 
respondents neither agreed nor disagreed and only one respondent strongly disagreed that the 
Department should have a code of ethics for all staff members. 
 
4.7.7. Department should provide a whistle blowing hotline for staff and other stakeholders 
to report suspicions of fraud 
The literature emphasized the importance of having a reliable and independent whistle blowing 
hotline.  It can be used by both employees and external stakeholders to report fraud related matters.  
A sound whistleblowing policy that ensures the freedom and safety of the whistle-blower is also 
needed.  Results on respondent’s opinion on the whistle blowing hotline are highlighted in Figure 





Figure 4.30: Whistle blowing Hotline for staff and other stakeholders 
 
The results show that over 90% of respondents (32 respondents agreed and other 42 strongly 
agreed), believed that the Department should provide a whistle blowing hotline for staff and other 
stakeholders to report suspicious fraud.  Seven respondents (representing only 8 % of the sample) 
neither agreed nor disagreed, while only one respondent strongly disagreed with the Department 
providing a whistle blowing hotline.  
 
4.7.8. Conduct regular surprise fraud audits  
Sivnarain (2013) states that surprise fraud audits are one of the most effective tools in fighting and 
combating fraud.  It also ensures that employees behave properly.  Figure 4.31 shows the results 





Figure 4.31: Respondent’s perspectives on conducting surprise fraud audits often 
 
The results show that 84 respondents, made up of 28 who agreed and 56 who strongly agreed, and 
representing more than 92% of the sample, believed that the Department should conduct regular 
surprise fraud audits.  Three respondents (representing only 3% of the sample) neither agreed nor 
disagreed, while 3% disagreed and strongly disagreed on conducting surprise fraud audit. 
 
4.8. Summary  
This chapter presented the results of the questionnaires conducted with staff of KZNDOH to 
determine the efficiency and effectiveness of FRM in the Department.  The results were divided 
into five broad thematic areas, namely:  
a. Profile of the respondent;  
b. Information on fraud risk management at KZNDOH; 
c. Respondent’s opinion to the causes of fraud committed by employees; 
d. Opinion on the effectiveness of the current FRM intervention; and 
e. Department’s role in involving all the employees to combat fraud 
The results met the objectives of this study and answered the research questions.   A key finding 
from the data showed that the key objectives of FRM have not been fully achieved at the 
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Department.  Furthermore, the respondents do not comprehend the concept and are not sure of 
their expectations in combating fraud. The findings identified all the variables (negative or 
positive) necessary to determine whether the current FRM at the Department is efficient and 


















CHAPTER FIVE - DISCUSSION 
5.1. Introduction 
This study investigated the efficiency and effectiveness of the Fraud Risk Management/Fraud 
Prevention Plan for KwaZulu Natal Department of Health, eThekwini Region. This chapter 
discusses the results from the questionnaires conducted with staff in the KZNDOH. This chapter 
will present findings that the Department should consider in addressing fraud.  It further 
recommends ways that the Department can utilise it’s already existing fraud risk plans to combat 
fraud.  The limitations of this study are discussed in detail at a later stage in the chapter.  Finally, 
this chapter highlights possible gaps and possibilities for further research. 
5.2. Discussion 
Discussions in this section will be based on the objectives of the study highlighted in Chapter One 
and discussed in conjunction with the findings as presented in Chapter Four.  The study met its 
objectives as the discussions and the analysis below will show.  
5.2.1. Demographics of the sample 
Specific demographics such as the age and gender of the participants were not pertinent to the 
study.  The study targeted any gender and age, as participants were chosen randomly and it was 
dependent on their availability at the time the questionnaires were distributed.  Female respondents 
made up over 50% of respondents while men made up less than 45% of the respondents. The 
largest age group was those 40 and above at over 44% of the sample. This was expected as more 
than 57% of respondents have been with the Department for more than 5 years.  Wells (1990) in 
his article “Six Common Myths about Fraud”, states that the assumption that older employees 
commit fraud more than younger ones is a myth.   
 
5.2.2. Objective One:  To investigate whether the current fraud risk management strategies 
are yielding any results in the fight against fraud. 
There is no way of measuring the effectiveness of the current Department’s fraud prevention plan, 
as it is still investigating numerous cases of fraud.  The Governance unit mostly concentrates their 
energies in fraud investigations, and hardly in the fraud prevention strategies.  Statistics from the 
2013/2014 Annual Report show that fraud is still a problem in the Department (Zungu, 2014a). 
Fraud occurs despite various resources in place to curb and prevent fraud like the National 
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Treasury Draft Fraud Management Framework, the KwaZulu Natal Anti-Fraud Strategy, the 
KwaZulu Natal Anti-Fraud Policy and KZN Health Fraud Prevention Plan. Unauthorised 
expenditure does not fall under the broad definition of fraud, but for the layman it is always 
construed as fraud.  The damning 2014/2015 report by the Auditor General that more than 90% of 
the unauthorized expenditure came from the Department of Health in KwaZulu Natal (Makwetu, 
2015); suggests that the interventions in place are currently not adequate.   
 
5.2.3. Objective Two:  To investigate employee’s knowledge of fraud risk management. 
The objectives of the Department’s fraud prevention plan are to involve all the employees in the 
fight to combat fraud within the Department.  Objectives B, C and D of the Department’s fraud 
prevention plan, emphasizes how all employees must be part of the fight against fraud (Dlamini, 
2014).  Previous studies on fraud and corruption show that in order for fraud risk management to 
work, employees must be fully aware of its objectives and be included at all times (Kaptein and 
Schwartz, 2008).  The findings by a survey conducted by the PSC, found that Departments had 
adequate and comprehensive fraud risk management strategies, but did not test whether employees 
within those Departments had knowledge of such strategies (Sangweni, 2007).  Literature review 
indicated that the most effective tool in fighting fraud is a Tip-Offs Anonymous or whistleblowing 
hotline (Pickett, 2011). 
The results of the study revealed that most respondents were familiar with the concept of FRM.  
They were also aware of an in-house forensics investigation unit.  Ultimately, the goal should be 
to ensure that all employees in the Department are aware of the various fraud risk strategies.  The 
results further give a picture that more than 80% of the respondents think that the Department has 
a problem with fraud, while more than 82% have never attended a fraud awareness training.  The 
overwhelming 72% of the respondents did not know the Department’s Tip-Offs Anonymous 
number.  The results show inconsistences in the training of employees, with only 18% of 
respondents having participated in the Department’s fraud awareness training.  All the 16 
respondents who have been trained were in the management and senior management positions.  It 
is important that the Department provides training and implements the awareness campaigns to all 
staff at all levels.  
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5.2.4. Objective Three:  To establish employee involvement in the fight to combat fraud 
A review of a wide range of literature show the importance of involving employees in the fight to 
combat fraud in organisations.  The study considers the involvement of employees in the fight 
against fraud.  Based on the findings, most of the employees are not involved in the fight again 
fraud.   
The aim of fraud risk is to ensure that staff get involved and own the process of fighting fraud and 
corruption. Staff have a huge role to play in the fight against fraud.  There is no way an organisation 
can win the fight against fraud without the support and commitment of employees in the anti-fraud 
strategy.  Failure to involve them might result in increased  and never-ending fraudulent activities 
(Pickett, 2011).  Possessing a wide range of detailed and comprehensive documentation on fraud 
risk management/anti-fraud strategies is not on its own effective in informing, training and 
building employee awareness.  Training and awareness campaigns are needed, so that employees 
will understand their role and how they can involve themselves in the fight against fraud (Richard 
et al., 2011).  The Integrity Survey of  2008-2009 conducted by KPMG, found that more than 94% 
of respondents found that training on standards of conducts was clear and easy to comprehend, 
91% stated that communication and training is effective in guiding their decisions and conduct on 
a daily basis, while 90% felt the training was provided to them when they needed it (Richard et 
al., 2011).        
The results of this study are not in line with effective fraud risk management.  No employee 
involvement was identified during the study.  Over 77% of respondents have never attended fraud 
risk training of any kind. The vast majority of respondents are not even aware of the Fraud 
Prevention Plan document.  Wells (2011) states that unless the majority of employees are 
committed to reducing occupational fraud or any type of proactive fraud fighting, the program is 
not going to be successful.  He further suggests that at the very least, an organisation should 




5.2.5. Objective Four:  To investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department’s 
current fraud risk management. 
Like any other organisation, the Department’s desired goal is zero percent fraud, as outlined in 
their fraud prevention plan.  The Department has no statistical results to prove that there has been 
a vast improvement its fight against fraud since the adoption of its fraud risk plan.   
No studies have been found to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the fraud risk 
management. Wei et al. (2013) found that it is very hard to determine the effective and efficient 
detection of banking fraud. Scholars agree that there is insufficient existing research to explore 
effective practices to reduce fraud and corruption.  Materials need to be developed to implement 
an effective anti-corruption practice for the public service (Nkondo, 2015).    
This study is unable to ascertain whether the Department’s current fraud prevention plan is 
effective and sufficient, because of the lack of comparable data before the document was 
introduced prior to the conduct of this study.  The fact that there are still allegations of fraud and 
newspaper reports of fraud within the Department, one can conclude that the Department has not 
reached a zero percent fraud rate as of yet.   
5.2.6. Objective Five:  Help the Department in identifying areas that are susceptible to 
fraud (risk areas), where more efforts can be concentrated in the fight against fraud. 
This study covered a wide range of units including Administration, Corporate, Specialized, and 
Health Services, Maintenance and Technical Services, and Risk Assurance Management.  The 
reason behind covering this wide spectrum was to try and identify sections that were worse off in 
terms of vulnerability to fraud.  A full fraud health check, where individual units will be diagnosed 
further on their susceptibility to fraud is recommended.  The study revealed that most respondents 
were not informed with regards to the fraud that occurred in their respective units.   
Literature reiterates the importance of informing and disclosing findings of fraud and the taking of 
decisive action against perpetrators.  These actions show how important it is for the Department 
to fight and combat fraud (Pickett, 2011).     
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5.3. Summary 
The primary objective of the study was to research the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Department’s fraud risk management.  Based on the objectives of the study, the data collected 
revealed that although the Department has documents in place, they have failed to implement them.  
The respondents presented evidence that the Department has not involved them in the fight against 
fraud.  The Department has also failed to reach all its employees to train them in their fraud 
prevention plan.  Furthermore, most employees were aware of the investigation unit, but did not 
have full knowledge of anti-fraud/fraud risk/fraud prevention strategies that the Department has.  
The overwhelming majority believed that the Department is a victim of crime because of fraud 
committed by staff.  More than 80% of respondents knew that the Department has a problem with 
fraud.  The objectives and aims of the study were achieved, although some were not fully 
addressed, because they required further research and there was a lack of literature. The next 











CHAPTER SIX - RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1. Introduction 
The high incidence of fraud in South Africa, particularly in the public service (Public Sector) has 
resulted in a high number of government interventions to combat fraud, including Chapter 9 
institutions such as the offices of the Auditor General and Public Protector; in house fraud fighting 
units like the SAPS Commercial Crime Units; legislation and other documents such as fraud risk 
management frameworks.  The fraud epidemic filters down to provincial Departments and 
municipalities.  The Department of Health in KwaZulu Natal is no exception as well as other 
government Departments.  It has a well-run corporate governance unit, with professional staff to 
ensure that the Department operates with integrity and honesty.  The Department has very 
comprehensive documents to ensure governance prevails.   
The study was conducted to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of fraud risk management at 
KZNDOH.  The findings were analysed in the previous chapter to generate recommendations that 
could not only help the Department better combat fraud, but to address gaps in existing literature 
on FRM. .   
6.2. Recommendations 
This study recommends that the KwaZulu Natal Department of Health: 
a. Create a comprehensive training plan on fraud prevention plan/fraud risk management and 
conduct regular awareness campaigns that target all employees in the Department.  The 
employees should not be selected on the basis of their gender, religion, position they 
occupy or their level.  Governance management should work in conjunction with the 
Human Resources Department to align their orientation of new employees with these 
awareness campaigns. Training could increase staff awareness of their expectations when 
it comes to fighting fraud.   
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b. Consider developing a computer program where employees must read and answer 
questions on the Department’s fraud prevention plan.  The exercise should be made 
compulsory for all employees and be part of the Department’s annual performance 
management processes.  Employees should also receive regular emails regarding new 
findings or developments in fraud issues from the governance unit in the Department.  
More efforts by management is needed to encourage employees to go through the intranet 
page and provide regular updates; 
 
c. Ensure management considers separate training for higher level employees, so they can be 
held accountable for fraud committed under their watch.  This could also encourage good 
governance at the top.   
 
d. Consider conducting a fraud health check for all its units, to determine which ones are 
vulnerable to fraud.  This could help in identifying units that require more attention and 
enhancing internal controls for the most vulnerable units. The fraud register should be 
monitored more frequently to look for common trends of fraud and seek solutions.  On 
identification of vulnerable units, snap or surprise audits can be initiated to ensure that the 
gaps are closed and perpetrators are brought to book.  
 
e. Consider sharing information regarding cases involving fraud, corruption and 
maladministration.  Speculations and gossip by employees must be eliminated through 
regular and accurate information.  The Departmental wins (on tribunal) must be shared 
with all employees.  This will demonstrate that the Department is serious about taking 
decisive action against fraud, corruption and maladministration.  The information on 
employees that hold high morals must also be recognized and communicated.   
 
f. Promote the anonymity and safety of reporting on the whistle blowing hotline.  Matters 
received from the hotline are attended to immediately so that people will be encouraged to 




6.3. Limitations of the Study 
The following limitations were identified during the study:   
A few limitations emerged in the process of conducting the study, these include:  
a. The limited time (less than four months) to conduct the the study due to delays in the ethical 
clearance process. 
 
b. The focus of the study on one region (eThekwini Region) out of the four in KZN and the 
participation of some, not all, of the officials in the Department. Thus the findings of the 
study do not reflect the views of all employees of the KZNDOH.  
c. The unwillingness, by respondents, to complete an online (questionpro.com) survey which 
led to the manual distribution and capture of their responses, resulting in a time- consuming 
data collection process.  
 
d. A limited availability of literature on the efficiency and effectiveness of fraud risk 
management.  
 
6.4. Recommendations for further research 
The limitations identified above and the research findings give grounds for furthering this study.  
It is therefore recommended that further research be conducted in this field.  Nkondo (2015) 
recommended that further research be conducted on the effectiveness of anti-fraud strategies. The 
following are suggestions for an expansion of future research:   
a. A full study that explores the effectiveness and efficiency of FRM for the entire KwaZulu 
Natal Department of Health should be conducted, to obtain a holistic view on the findings 
form this study.   
 
b. Investigate in more detail the reasons why the policies and regulations pertaining to fraud, 
corruption and maladministration set by the provincial national government Department 




This study aimed at examining the efficiency and effectiveness of fraud risk management within 
the Department.  The research objectives were met and limitations were also noted.  The study will 
help the Department in designing a workable approach into ensuring the effectiveness of their 
fraud prevention plan.  Comprehensive recommendations informed by the findings of the study 
were made, with the hope that they will be implemented.  Areas for further research on the subject 
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